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While many international lawmaking
jurisdictions have incorporated plain language principles
forstatutory drafting, the United States remains reluctant,
and subsequently has no official policy on employing
such principles for the drafting of federal legislation.
Though Executive Orders and congressional statutes
regarding plain writing have recently been enacted, these
have been aimed at Executive Agency regulations and
communications, not statutes. This article explores the
current prospects of plain language implementation for
U.S. statutory law, relying primarily on interviews from
Congressional insiders, including lawmakers, staffers
and legal/political journalists. Responses demonstrated
that plain language standards for statutory law in the
U.S. do not seem likely to be implemented anytime
soon. However, interviewees also noted the significant
contribution that the health care debate of 2009 was
having on the legislative process, including an increased
focus on statutory text by both lawmakers and citizens.
Discussion of plain language principles was certainly
present on Capitol Hill during the health care debate.
If such standards are ever implemented, interviewee
responses suggest that this debate could be recognized
as a pivotal moment in regard to the general access
and understandability of such text that the public
faces when interacting with legislation. Additionally,
this article discusses both the premise and challenges of
plain language being considered a democratic right, and
ultimately recommends that a legislative commission
study the prospect of plain language in US statutory
drafting.
I. Introduction
It is difficult to come across anyone,
be they a politician, lawyer, academic,
administrator or anyone else who deals
regularly with legislation, who now
disagrees with the main tenets ofplain
language legislative drafting - that the
law should be expressed in the simplest
terms available and in a way which
communicates directly and effectively
with as much of its intended audience
as possible.2
Plain language legislative drafting has
developed rapidly over the past few decades, and is
now a common international lawmaking practice.3
That is not to say that the practice is uncontroversial,
however.' In terms of American public law, finding
those that disagree with the above quotation was
not too difficult; all one has to do is question those
working inside and around the U.S. Congress.'
While Congress has implemented plain writing
conventions and an emphasis on clear language in
terms of Executive Agency materials,' the statutes
that govern the American people remain exempt
from such standards. This presents a problem because
statutes are the primary source of law; "govern[ing]
almost every facet of our lives from birth to death,
and even after.'" According to interviews of American
legislative insiders regarding clear law and plain
language, a major opening for plain language reform
arose during the health care debate, as an increasing
number of individuals were interacting with the bill
text as it travelled through the legislative process and
lawmakers began to make calls for plain language bills
on Capitol Hill. However, many interviewees, some
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of whom draft legislation themselves, stated that the
situation as it pertains to federal statutes does not
seem likely to change anytime soon.
Controversy over the use of plain language
within the legal community has existed for centuries,'
but the movement only started gaining greater
amounts of support and influence within the past three
to four decades.' Some believe that employing plain
language renders legal texts inaccurate and populist,'o
while others think that such language expands the
usability and clarity of such texts, making them more
accessible for those with and without legal training."
Despite the ongoing debate on this issue within the
U.S. legal community, many foreign countries have
decided that implementing plain language drafting
standards for legislation is essential to running an
effective government. 12
This article first describes both the domestic
and international plain language landscape. In doing
so it demonstrates that while the U.S. has tepidly
applied plain language standards to governmental
communication throughout the years, though never
to statutory law, many of the Nation's international
contemporaries have begun to draft nearly all of their
laws in plain languagel3 and some are currently revising
existing laws to bring them into compliance with plain
language standards.' Next, the article presents views
from U.S. legislative insiders on the prospects of plain
language in U.S. statutory law. Recommendations
and implementation of such plain language principles
are explored in the subsequent section, and the article
ends with concluding statements.
II. The Domestic & International Plain Language
Context
A. Domestic
Ishouldapologize, perhaps, for the style
of this bill. I dislike the verbose and
intricate style of the English statutes. .
. . You, however, can easily correct this
bill to the taste of my brother lawyers,
by making every other word a 'said' or
'aforesaid,' and saying everything over
two or three times, so that nobody but
we ofthe craft can untwist the diction,
and find out what it means; and that,
too, not so plainly but that we may
conscientiously divide one halfon each
side. Mend it, therefore, in a form and
substance to the orthodox taste, and
make it what it should be; or, ifyou
think it radically wrong, try something
else, and let us make a beginning in
some way.'5
ThomasJefferson
The plain language movement in the U.S.
began to build momentum in the 1970s following
the publication of David Mellinkoff's triumph, The
Language of the Law,'" which explored some of the
deficiencies of legal language and challenged it to
become more like common speech.' 7 In his work,
Mellinkoff provocatively stated that "[1] aymen are
certain that law language is not English. Statutes make
the distinction official."" The author also documented
not only the history of the language of the law, but
thoroughly prescribed his four recommendations for
legal language: to make it "more precise, shorter, more
intelligible, [and] more durable."" Jimmy Carter
capitalized on repeatedly lambasting the complexity
of the Internal Revenue Code in his 1976 presidential
campaign, and was the first President to issue an
Executive Order ("E.O.") mandating plain English
for significant regulations.20 New York was the first
U.S. state to pass a plain language law in relation to
consumer contracts, doing so in 1977,21 and several
other states followed suit by enacting laws mandating
the usage of plain language.22
Executive Orders were the first pieces of
federal law to mention plain language in governmental
operations. The most recent E.O. issued by President
Barack Obama on this subject, E.O. 13,563:
Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 23
builds on previous plain language acknowledgement
by two Executive Orders from former President Bill
Clinton24 and one from former President Jimmy
Carter.25 President Obama's E.O. stresses that the
regulatory system "must ensure that regulations are
accessible, consistent, written in plain language, and
easy to understand." 26 President Clinton's 1993 E.O.
incorporated similar language, expressing that "[e]
ach agency shall draft its regulations to be simple and
easy to understand, with the goal of minimizing the
potential for uncertainty and litigation arising from
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such uncertainty. "27 Additionally, a 1996 Executive
Order by President Clinton in relation to civil justice
repeatedly mentions "clear language."" While this
E.O. mentions clear language in relation to both
legislation and regulation, the U.S. Congress has
never considered or agreed upon any authoritative
standards regarding clear or plain language in terms
of statutory law. 29 However, Congress has recently
implemented plain language standards for federal
agencies.
Executive agencies have implemented the
Plain Writing Act of 2010 ("the Act"), which was
signed into law on October 13, 20103' and
complements the previously-mentioned Executive
Orders. Section 2 of the Act notes that its purpose
"is to improve the effectiveness and accountability
of Federal agencies to the public by promoting
clear Government communication that the public
can understand and use." 3 The Act lays out the
responsibilities of federal agencies in terms of utilizing
plain language on their websites and in official
reports. 32 However, Section 6 of the Act prohibits
judicial review enforceability of such publications for
their compliance with the Act. In addition, Section
6(b) provides that "[n]o provision of this Act shall be
construed to create any right or benefit, substantive
or procedural, enforceable by any administrative or
judicial action."34 These provisions constitute an
important disclaimer: though the Act was designed
to "promot[e] clear Government communication that
the public can understand and use,"35 it explicitly
provides the American public with no right to such
language.
Federal employees, official statutory drafters,
and others have also taken further steps. A federal
Plain Language governmental website has been set up
that provides more information on the use of plain
language 6 and links to federal guidelines,3 7 agency
requirements,38 and useful examples and tips,"
among other things. There are even monthly PLAIN
(Plain Language Action and Information Network)
meetings, a group comprised of federal employees
from various agencies working to make government
communications clearer.40 This represents concerted
effort by employees to further implement plain
language reform within the federal government.
In regard to statutory drafting, the official
drafting manuals of both the House and Senate
Legislative Counsel do mention readability and
understandability, two primary characteristics of
plain language. The House manual notes in Section
102(f)(3) that a "Draft Should Be Readable and
Understandable - In almost all cases, the message
has a better chance of accomplishing your client's
goal if it is readable and understandable. It should
be written in English for real people."' The Senate
manual contains similar language, noting in Section
107 that "[a] draft must be understandable to the
reader. The rules in this manual should be applied in
a manner that makes the draft clearer and easier to
understand."4 2 Yet these manuals are not binding when
drafting legislation and the House blatantly ignores
the House Drafting Manual in particular situations.4 3
Additionally, many of the insiders interviewed for this
article do not believe that U.S. legislation is becoming
clearer or that Congress should draft its legislation
in "plain English." Besides these fleeting passages,
neither the Senate nor House Legislative Counsels
make mention of clear language goals in any other
form. For example, the House Legislative Counsel
has two documents available on their website, a Quick
Guide to Legislative Drafting" and an Introduction to
Legislative Drafting," but neither mentions clarity,
clear language, nor plain language. Conversely, many
other official parliamentary or legislative counsels
from other countries have written their own dossiers
or instruction manuals on the topic.4 6
American courts have also imposed clear-
statement rules on the legislature in particular
situations, but these mostly relate to accuracy
standards, rather than implementing plain language
principles. The clear-statement rule doctrine
stipulates that "a legal instrument, esp. a statute, will
not have some specified effect unless that result is
unquestionably produced by the text."47 For example,
the case Gregory v. Ashcrofj48 imposed these rules in
relation to federalism, noting that, "Congress should
make its intention 'clear and manifest' if it intends
to pre-empt the historic powers of the States."" This
"presumption against waiver of sovereign immunity
canon" is present in other U.S. Supreme Court
cases,50 a recent illustration of which is apparent
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.5 1 In Hamdan, the U.S.
Supreme Court "held that the traditional forms of
adjudication should be presumed unless Congress has
legislated exceptional procedures in clear language."52
The "void-for-vagueness" or "fair notice" doctrine
is another example of the Court imposing clear
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drafting principles on the writers of legislation. This
doctrine comes into effect when courts determine
that criminal statutes lack sufficient definitiveness or
specificity." The U.S. Supreme Court has decided
that such unclear language violates the Due Process
Clause because "[m]en of common intelligence
cannot be required to guess at the meaning of [an]
enactment." 4 As such, courts can and do prescribe
drafting standards to the legislature, and this has been
especially true in terms of clear, accurate language.
Prominent legal scholars have also advocated
plain language. U.S. drafting expert and influential
commentator Reed Dickerson has stated that many
draftsmen apparently do not realize that, in addition
to providing rights, duties, and privileges; legal
instruments are also communications." He notes
that "the audience" is one of the four main elements
of communications, and stresses that "such laws
[should also be] intelligible and feasible to the general
public.""6 William Eskridge, Phillip Frickey and
Elizabeth Garrett note that a bill should be drafted
"so that the language and organization are no more
complicated than necessary."" The authors continue
by stating that "[t]he main purpose of statutes is to
communicate directions to citizens, telling us what
legal rights and duties we have in our polity. . .
. [I]t is certainly the job of the statutory drafter to
communicate what directives there are with clarity
and precision to the citizenry.""
From the information provided above there
would seem to be a burgeoning tide of momentum
for plain language in US statutory law. That is not the
case. While there is some movement in that direction,
statutes remain unrestrained by any type of official
plain language standard. The interviews discussed
in this article elaborate on why this is the case, and
provide enlightening views on where plain language
statutory use currently stands with Congress.
B. International
The opening paragraph of this article noted
the many jurisdictions that actively engage in plain
language statutory drafting, as opposed to the U.S.'
passive style for Executive Agency communication and
regulation." While America has struggled to discuss
the issue in much depth, many other governments
and parliamentary/legislative counsels have issued
reports on plain language in legislation or are required
to draft in such language.60 Examining where U.S.
contemporaries stand in terms of employing plain
language (and especially plain English) in legislation
can aid this endeavor, and provide a context for the
interviews detailed below.
Many jurisdictions recognize the benefits
of employing plain language. The United Kingdom
Office of the Parliamentary Counsel issued drafting
advice in 2011 that covers the issue of "clarity" in
depth, and which includes the use of plain language.
The U.K. has also been undergoing a Tax Law Rewrite
Project since 1996, which aims to use language that is
plainer and simpler for their tax code.62 The Scottish
Parliamentary Counsel advocates for the use of plain
language and in 2006 issued a dossier detailing such use
in Scottish statutes and throughout the international
community. 6 Since 1992, the European Union has
advocated for "clearer, simpler acts complying with
good principles of legislative drafting."' Sweden
has been advocating plain language practices in
legislation since 1976, and has linguists examine all
bills before sending them to press.S The Australian
Parliamentary Counsel ("APC"), however, probably
provides the most comprehensive information on
plain language drafting. In total, thirteen documents
are available on the APC website in regard to the
subject, 66 including articles on plain language drafting
written by APC members,67 a Plain English Manual,'
and instructional "Drafting Directions" provided
by the First Parliamentary Counsel,69 among other
documents. The APC defends their rationale for
drafting in plain English by noting,
We also have a very important
duty to do what we can to make
laws easy to understand. If laws
are hard to understand, they lead
to administrative and legal costs,
contempt of the law and criticism
of our Office. Users of our laws are
becoming increasingly impatient
with their complexity. Further, if we
put unnecessary difficulties in the
way of our readers, we do them a
gross discourtesy. Finally, it [i]s hard
to take pride in our work if many
people can't understand it.70
Some countries mentioned above have
had commissions or Law Review Units throughout
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the years that thoroughly examined plain language.
Ireland has had both. The Irish Law Reform
Commission issued their "Statutory Drafting and
Interpretation: Plain Language and the Law" report
in December of 2000." The report advocated the
use of "familiar and contemporary language,"72 but
stressed a commitment to legal certainty.73 Ireland's
Statute Law Revision Unit goals are to "consolidate,
streamline and simplify Irish statutes and to make
legislation more accessible to the public."7' The fruits
of their Revision Unit produced the Statute Law
(Restatement) Act, which allows Ireland's Attorney
General to "restate legislation in a more readable
format. "7
Influential think tanks and drafters in the
U.K. also advocate plain language, though they do
so cautiously. A recent Hansard Society report on
"Making Better Law" supports the increased use of
plain language bills, noting that the "actual text of
the law also needs to be as accessible as possible to
the widest possible audience."7' Even though the
U.K. Parliamentary Counsel endorses a standard
of clarity, the report notes that many U.K. statutes
remain "less than accessible," and that this can have
a compromising effect on the clarity of bills and
laws.n Experienced UK drafter Ian McLeod states,
"all good drafting is as plain as it can reasonably be.
Once this is accepted, it follows that the principles
of plain language provide a sub-text to all effective
guidance on good drafting."78 As can be seen from the
above, many jurisdictions advocate the use of plain
language in statutes. Parliamentary Counsel Offices
of the respected jurisdictions officially advance those
directives, but at times law commissions, law revision
units, think tanks, and others, such as influential
drafters (both officially and unofficially) endorse
them as well.
III. Insider Interviews
In order to determine if the plain language
movement has any traction in Congress, legislative
insiders were questioned about whether they thought
American statutory law was moving in this direction.
The interviews were performed in the fall of 2009,
in the middle of the health care debate that led to
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010." In total, twelve legislative insiders were
interviewed, consisting of: one member of Congress,
five House staffers, one Senate staffer, and five legal
and/or political journalists. Responses fell within three
categories: (1) current prospects for plain language in
congressional statutes, (2) public access to legislation,
and (3) additional points relating to plain language.
A. Current Prospects
A Senate staffer provided the clearest
evidence that plain language has indeed been an issue
on Capitol Hill, and especially with the health care
bill. He noted, "[w]ell, the Finance committee had a
version of the health care bill that was in plain English,
before they sent it to Legislative Counsel to change it.
Also, [Senator] Bunning and [Senator] Conrad had
a debate over which version of the bill to debate, the
plain English one or the Legislative Counsel one."8
This represents the most convincing evidence that
plain language bills are not only written in particular
situations, but that legislators would at times prefer
to discuss the plain language version over the more
technical version. However, one journalist accurately
summed up the state of official Congressional
legislation in terms of technical versus plain language
drafting, declaring, "clear language or not .. . one bill
is going to become law, and it's not the clear language
bill."8 2
A couple of respondents stated that members
of Congress or of Congressional staff had mentioned
or at least thought about clear or plain language at
certain points. As a staffer noted, "[t] here are definitely
some bills that have been introduced over the last few
sessions about clear legislative language, and laymen's
terms, and plain-speak . . . people say things like
that."83 In addition, a legal journalist stated that, "I
think there's been a movement to do that with laws
that are on the books. You know, to kind of clarify . .
put plain language for laws that are on the books.""
The lawmaker interviewed stated that she
had not "heard that argued" about Congressional
legislation, but noted that she was a freshman legislator.
8 Other interviewees, however, were disparaging in
terms of the prospects for plain language. One House
staffer noted:
[T]here's so much legalese in legisla-
tive text that . . . I don't think that
aspect of it has changed or will
change in the near future, maybe
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over time. But, I still think the actual
text will remain very legal and very
... Beltway . .. as we say, inside the
Beltway . . . and then it will be up
to those interest groups or whoever
to, you know, break it down and
present the sides for folks to look at.
But, I don't think the actual text will
change, or the style of the text will
change."
Supporting this notion, another staffer
declared, "unfortunately that's not the way it is
here," 7 and noted in a follow up question about
whether or not such language has been changing at
all in legislation by answering, "[n]o . . . you need
it to be technical here."" Another House staffer
reported the surprising belief that the current lack
of plain language use in Congress was due to public
mistreatment of bills and laws, noting,
I think it would be great to have more
simple legislative language if people
... really wanted to engage with it in
a good faith manner . .. but ... right
now in the absence of the expertise
to evaluate what the legislative lan-
guage says, people just use opacity to
reinforce their preconceived notions
of what Congress is trying to do. So,
that's unfortunate. So, to the extent
that that situation can be alleviated,
I don't know that it's a matter of,
you know, changing the entire legal
code to read more in plain English
. . . that's possible, but then again,
I mean, that could have all kinds of
unintended consequences."
Most journalists believed the prospects for
plain statutory language were dire. One exclaimed,
[n]o, to the contrary. Statutes are
really a mess. There's a little bit of
a movement in the law generally,
but in federal statutes I haven't seen
efforts to make it readable. In fact, . .
. in order to attract votes, and to get
people on board, there's purposeful
ambiguity inserted in the statutes so
that people can plausibly say they
voted for X or Y and the Courts
will decide later on what it really
means.9 0
Another journalist stated, "No, no, not at all,
no. I mean legislation in Congress is actually written
by the clerk's office, a guy sits there in legalese, I mean,
it's impenetrable, you know. They usually include
some type of executive summary or something like
that, I think. But no, no movement that I've seen
in the U.S. toward that sort of thing."" Another
answered,
I don't see that happening anytime
soon. I just think we've crossed that
point in both the way the Republic
is organized, and . . . but look there
are, I think, there are a lot more
entities now who are reading bills
and translating them and saying ...
not just the media, but all the parti-
san organizations, and blogs that are
translating them . . . so, there really
isn't any neutral arbiter of what is in
a bill anymore. Um . . . and that's
neither good nor bad, I think it's just
a consequence of what's happening
with technology especially.92
He went on to explain his answer by
declaring, "[w]ell I think that . . . in part because
the guardians of the . . . well, the mandarins of the
power structure in some sense, want to preserve their
element of savviness and specialness." 3
The Senate staffer's revelation that lawmakers
were having discussions over whether or not to debate
the plain language or the technical version of a bill is
certainly positive news for plain language advocates.
This is evidence that such language for statutory law
may indeed have some momentum in Congress. Other
interviewees, however, viewed immediate prospects
for statute law to be either non-existent or somewhat
minimally discussed in Congress. Journalists seemed
much more somber on such prospects than staffers,
who mentioned that plain language had been
discussed on some occasions. 4 Additionally, one
staffer expressed the desire to utilize plain legislative
language, but did not think the American public was
ready to engage with it in good faith.
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B. Public Access to Legislation
Public access to and understandability
of legislation is one of the main goals of the plain
language movement. While such standards have been
achieved to a certain extent for Executive Agency
communications and regulations," a statutory
standard remains elusive. However perceptions could
be changing, as interviewees reveal below.
Health care reform was in full swing at the
time of the interviews and received a significant
amount of attention from respondents. Should
Congress ever embrace the use of plain language in
U.S. statutes and legislative drafting, this period could
be seen as a major turning point both in the clarity of
statutes and in public attention paid to statutes. The
far-reaching effect that the health care debate had on
the respective legislation and the legislative process
more generally cannot be denied. As one House
staffer stated with respect to the proposed healthcare
bill,
As far as I know, nobody was talk-
ing about that even like a year ago.
I mean, I've been here for almost
two years and I remember last year
we didn't really get any calls about
people talking about the opacity
of legislation. I mean, fact is that
laws are complicated. You know,
that's why you have to go through
significant training to be a lawyer,
and you know actually writing laws
requires significant expertise . . . I
think things certainly have changed.
People feel that they ought to be
able to understand what the laws
are, and not just the summary of
[them]. Because, you know, you can
read this stuff, and unless you have
three or four existing federal codes
to reference, you would have abso-
lutely no idea what that was meant
to do, unless you have a summary
that you can read, which is gener-
ally what the member certainly, and
also often the staff . . operates on.
But, nobody had ever complained to
me, or I never heard any complaints
from our constituents that legisla-
tion was too opaque, until health
care reform came out. And I think
it's a factor . . . and I mean, I hate
to be too . . . I guess, dismissive of
it, but there's a strong streak of ama-
teurism, I guess .. . and that's good .
. . people should, you know, take an
ownership of the laws that are being
passed in Congress on their behalf."6
Another staffer noted that the length of
legislation and the complexity of the language were
being discussed in meetings around this time, as he
revealed,
In the meeting I just came out of,
that issue was raised with the health
care debate that we are currently
engaged in here in the U.S. Um
. . . one of the bills on the House
side is plus 1,500 pages . . . H.R.
3200. And, one of the comments
was, 'well, why can't we do this in
ten pages and write it in a way that
the average individual with a high
school education could understand'
... when [the legislators are] draft-
ing the legislation,... the purpose of
the legislation is to not to underwrite
the legislation in a way that confuses
people. But, because of the precision
and the technical attributes that are
required . . . it inevitably becomes
complicated. And when you talk
about health care . . . there are just
so many moving parts that it's really
hard to do everything that needs to
be done in ten pages. So, it turns
into 1500 pages. And it does take
some time and some skill to sit down
and read it. But, that's why members
of Congress have staffs, to sit there
and comb through that material.
And, one of the things we've been
pushing for now, here in Congress,
is making sure that all the bills . . .
are made available online so that the
average American can sit at home
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or go to the library or whatever and
wherever they have internet access,
and go through the process of read-
ing that bill. If they have questions,
then they are more than welcome
to pick up the telephone or write a
letter to their member of Congress.
And I would be hard pressed to find
a member of Congress who would
refuse to provide some type of
response to questions constituents
have regarding pieces of legislation.17
Additionally, a journalist also noted the
impact the health care debate was having on
the public's attention to the text of the bill, the
consequences of which spilled over to legislators when
they visited their constituencies, stating,
Well I think that there's a couple
issues there. One is that there's gen-
eral apathy, typically toward the leg-
islative process in the United States
. . . health care is a huge anomaly
. . . actually. I wrote a story about
people reading the health care bill,
literally. So . . . in August all these
Democrats are having town hall
meetings, and people are like getting
up and screaming at them and they
had read the bill. And I had talked
to some Republicans from the area
that I cover, and they were saying
that, their staff was saying that, they
had . . . their Congressman, had
to read the bill. They usually don't
read every . . . 850 page bill, they
maybe don't read every 850 page
bill, but they had constituents, who
are Republicans, who are already
going to vote against the bill, their
constituents know they're going to
vote against the bill, they're having
town-hall meetings, and people
were coming in with like the bill in
hand being like 'I'd like to refer you
to page 459 where they talk about
Medicare reimbursement levels
being like six to twenty percent',
and the Congressman has like never
encountered this before, where his
constituents have read every page of
the bill, and they're testing them, in
a way to make sure he's read it too.98
Those are just three prominent examples of
how the health care debate was influencing legislation,
lawmakers, and constituents in the fall of 2009.
Complexity of the law was another topic
mentioned by respondents. One staffer noted,
You know, it's complicated for a
reason. These are complex measures,
complex reforms. Like financial
regulatory reform, you can't get
the financial regulatory reform for
dummies, you know. You need to
know how the market works and
how the regulatory agencies work
and that requires really complicated
language. I don't necessarily agree
with, you know, I suppose dumbing
things down is unfair, but I don't
think our purposes would be served
by simplifying it so much that it
could be called 'clear language.'99
This response is a strong indictment of clear
language; it could explain both the Capitol Hill
mindset on plain language and the reason that the
movement has not gained much traction in Congress.
Another journalist touched on points
similar to those mentioned above, accentuating
the complexity of legislation and the roles that
representatives and their staffs play in governance. He
noted,
I think again, the way that our
Republic functions, is such that we
elect people to read bills for us. That
doesn't mean that citizens shouldn't
have every opportunity to look at
something themselves. But ... when
it comes to a complex piece of leg-
islation like health care reform, no
amount of plain language is going
to make it simple to understand . .
. and, in fact, you need quite a bit
of technical language when you're
talking about actuarial tables and
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adjustments to the tax code. So,
unless you simplify the underlying
dynamics, which you're not going to
do, it doesn't make sense to . .. you
just can't simplify the language . . .
. If there really was, to every single
bill, every controversial bill, a neu-
tral way of explaining it that both
sides could agree on . . . In other
words, it has legitimacy, then . . . it
would be feasible at least to require
or encourage . . . a plain-language
summary. And on certain bills it is
much easier . . . than others.'00
This answer touches on the quote provided
by one House staffer with respect to citizens engaging
in a good faith manner. 0' At times, the ideology of
particular citizens seems to trump accurate legislative
information. Therefore, questions remain as to
what type of an effect, if any, plain language would
have in mitigating the distrust that citizens have for
lawmakers and the information that they and their
staffs are providing. Explaining his earlier statement,
the aforementioned House staffer noted the following:
I mean, a lot of people simply don't
believe what we say . . . and that's a
shame ... and that's something that
we're working very hard on, and
Congressman is working
very hard on, but . . . you know,
there are a lot of people who will call
the office and say, 'well, . . . I looked
at the legislation', they may say
that, or 'I read that this section does
this', and we'll say no, that really
doesn't do that. The thing about the
bank accounts is about insurance
companies, and if they don't pay
then the government can seize . . .
or something like that. Um . . . a
perfectly reasonable, and in fact, the
correct explanation, they would say
. . . oh well; they just simply don't
believe it. And so, that's a shame .
. . but . . . I think the internet has
a lot to do with it. I mean, the bills
themselves are available, you know,
most people don't [know]. I mean,
they're surprised . . . like a lot of
people say, 'why don't you post the
bills on the internet,' and we say,
'look, every bill that's introduced is
posted on the internet, and you can
go find it'.'0 2
In terms of access to legislation, interviewees
focused on different elements of the issue. A few
noted the significance that the health care debate was
having in both the halls of Congress and in the minds
of the populace. In this instance, lawmakers and
staffers discussed plain language and, even in the face
of the technical language used in the official health
care bill, constituents were reading the legislation
and questioning their elected officials on the topic.
Technical complexity was also discussed, and included
in this discussion was the role of representative
politics: should legislators and their staffs be the ones
conveying legal and technical information about laws
to their constituents or should the general public take
more ownership of the laws that are being passed?
Congress rarely discussed these questions after the
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act'03 and they persist even after the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Sebelius.10' However, it seems
apparent that the grandiosity of the health care debate
got citizens more involved in the legislative process-
particularly in reading the text of bills.
C Additional Points Mentioned
Outside of the immediate prospects for plain
language statutory implementation and public access
to legislation, interviewees mentioned a number of
additional points. One staffer questioned the role
of both the legislature and the judiciary in terms of
drafting and interpreting legislation, and accentuated
the tension between the branches when deciding the
true meaning of particular statutory provisions. He
exclaimed,
Isn't the job of the legislature to
pass laws that are so specific that it
doesn't leave very much room for
justices or judges to interpret . . .
you know, they shouldn't have to
interpret a whole lot, I guess. They
should be able to make a judgment
about whether something is inside
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or outside the law, but I don't think
that as . . . generally unelected
officials, the judicial branch would
have too much authority to decide
what a law does or doesn't mean.
You know, because words are funny
things, they're very slippery. You
know, getting back to the acronyms,
they can mean a lot of different
things. So, I think that that could be
an unintended consequence, that it
could be a . .. in an effort to make
things more clear we could be mak-
ing them more ambiguous by using
plain English instead of legislative
language.'05
The concern expressed at the end of the
staffer's statement has been discussed in terms of
implementing plain language.10
Moving past the legislative text, one
journalist examined the summaries of bills and public
laws provided by the Congressional Research Service
and other outlets, which are supposed to be in plain
language. These important summaries provide the
most authoritative sources for the public in terms of
conveying the purposes behind particular laws. He
stated,
Now, whether they are doing a good
enough job of simplifying it . . .
maybe sometimes they are, maybe
sometimes they're not. But, they try
to say what it is about. California
has a very good legislative analyst
that writes bill summaries, and it's
on the cover of the bill. Like, if
you have the printed copy of the
bill, there's the legislative analyst's
summary, and then it will have
most check-offs, of some things you
would really want to know: fiscal
impact, you know, yes, no, imposes
mandate on local government, yes,
no. You know, certain things you
would probably want to know at a
glance to get a sense of what type of
bill this is and what type of impact
it's going to have. So, I don't know
if I would say it's a movement,...
I think it probably ebbs and flows.
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Perhaps the final statement by the journalist
is the most significant in terms of where current plain
language prospects stand for U.S. public law: besides
in a couple high profile instances, the American
people are not currently demanding it; so therefore
it is not a priority. Of course there have been "ebbs
and flows" of attention, as was demonstrated in the
health care debate and noted by various interviewee
responses above. Yet, overall, the so-called "apathy"
towards the legislative process mentioned above' is a
very real concern, and the plain language movement
for statutory law has therefore not been given much
attention either inside or outside of Washington.
IV. Is Plain Language a Democratic Right?
"That legislation should be accessible, intelligible and
clear to all audiences is both a democratic right and also
an essential prerequisite in the process of making better
law. " o0
The quotation above is from a report by
a highly respected U.K. think tank, the Hansard
Society, that examined how to make better laws.
Though the report focused on Westminster, the
quote's main premise is applicable to all contemporary
democracies: it calls clear and intelligible language
a democratic right. This is a bit stronger language
than is usually used on the subject.' In fact,
Congress explicitly noted in the Plain Writing Act
of 2010 that, "[n]o provision of this Act shall be
construed to create any right or benefit, substantive
or procedural, enforceable by any administrative or
judicial action.""' Yet, could the authors of the report
have a legitimate argument for employing such strong
language in their pronouncement above? If so, a few
important matters still need to be firmed up.
The statement is susceptible to the "utopia"
counter-argument: generally, that legislative text will
never be understandable by the whole citizenry. The
terms "accessible" and "intelligible" in the passage,
while imprecise, would probably not cause too much
controversy; 12 while the "clear to all audiences" phrase
is a vague statement that could indeed incite counter-
utopian critics. The target audience classification
THE 1IODERN AMERICAN24
for the phrase certainly needs more definition.
What exactly is meant by the words "all audiences"
(i.e., high school educated citizens, individuals over
a particular age, all audiences that the bill is aimed
at, all citizens, etc.)? This answer is difficult to
surmise when not properly specified. In order for
governments, drafting offices, and others to use this
standard, the report should provide a definition of
"all audiences."". If the authors merely meant "all
citizens," then a question remains as to whether
that standard is realistic or perhaps too ambitious.
Specifically defining an audience or audiences for
the implementation of plain language standards is
one of the missing pieces in many arguments made
by plain language advocates."' Should advocates
desire intelligible and clear legislative language for all
citizens, then the intricacies of the practice must be
taken into more extensive consideration.
Second, how would the term (and standard)
of "clear" be measured in regard to legal language?
As influential legal drafter and commentator Reed
Dickerson explained, "[t]he importance of clarity to
statutes needs little urging. Clarity is important not
only to the substance of the legislative message but also
to its adequacy as a means of transmission. A statute
is a communication and thus subject to the principles
applicable to communications."' 15  The current
Senate Legislative Drafting Manual mentions clear
language and understandability," 6 while the House
manual states that language should be "readable" and
"understandable."' 17 Ostensibly, legislative drafters
have been attempting to draft statutes with more
clarity for quite some time, sometimes with dubious
results."' The clear language standard differs between
individuals and drafting offices, and would be
inherently difficult to standardize. Therefore, a plain
language critic could easily assert that such a drafting
standard is impossible. In order to legitimize the idea
of clear drafting, further explanation and definition
is needed by drafters and advocates in terms of how
clarity in the law will be measured, if indeed plain
language standards are to be implemented in US
statutory law."
Third, what type of a democratic right
should "accessible, intelligible and clear" legislation,
or any other plain language variations, actually have?
Should it remain a non-enforceable standard applied
by drafting offices to their own work, or should the
citizens of democratic countries have some type of
binding, enumerated right to "accessible, intelligible
and clear" legislation? Obviously, the latter is a much
bolder type of right, but it could also lead to a litany
of litigation until either the courts, the legislature, or
both, agree upon the definitions of such terms. Many
countries that have implemented plain language
standards have followed the former classification, 120
and their drafting offices, not constitutions, statutory
law, or common law, are usually the places that plain
language is officially endorsed. 21 Nevertheless, these
distinctions are important for determining the future
of plain language legislation in democratic societies
and must be thoroughly considered by those drafting,
interpreting, and accessing legislation, if the U.S.
wants to implement plain language standards in the
future.
V. Recommendations
A. Possible Commission on Legislative Drafting
The fact that many international jurisdictions
and even some U.S. Presidents are attempting to draft
laws and official communications in plain language
makes the lack of attention to the issue on the U.S.
statutory side that much more curious. From the
interview responses discussed in this article, it appears
that some support exists in Congress for drafting laws
in plain English, even though some interviewees stated
that this is currently nowhere close to happening
while others suggested that laws are becoming even
more technical and complex.122 Thus, a practical idea
for investigation into drafting plain language statutes
would be to ask a commission to study the practice,
similar to what Ireland1 23 and Victoria1 24 have done.
This way, experts would be able to vet the idea more
thoroughly and some consensus may emerge. In fact,
it might be time for some form of an established
commission to critique Congressional legislation as a
whole. While the interview answers were mostly in
relation to plain legislative language, the responses
brought up a host of other issues. They covered public
trust in lawmakers and staff, the role of lawmakers and
staff in communicating with the public, and whether
bills and acts should have official summaries and other
relevant information displayed on the face of the
printed version. The communication of laws between
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a government and its citizens is vitally important,
and as statutes get longer, more frequent, and are
increasingly politicized,125 setting up a commission to
study the drafting and communication of laws could
only be a positive step for the future of U.S. statutory
law.
One essential for any commission on plain
language would be to solicit and examine empirical
data on the use of plain language and how this impacts
the clarity and understanding of statutes. There seems
to be very little empirical data on plain language
available, though there are a few sources that state it
was helpful in certain experiments. 126 The discussion
thus far has been largely a normative debate, and the
lack of empirical discussion seems odd with so many
advocates and critics of the practice. Additionally,
Redish points out in comparison to other fields,
that, "before products and documents are released,
representatives of the audiences for the products or
documents try them out. Agencies and companies
that produce successful products and documents
use the test results to improve their work before it
is released." 127 This is an astute point concerning
legislation, which usually does not go through
such scrutiny before being officially introduced by
lawmakers. Some jurisdictions (e.g. the Westminster
Parliament) release draft bills before introducing
them to the legislature in order to gain initial public
and special interest group feedback. 128 Not providing
any official vehicles for the study or improvement of
legislation in the U.S., such as a legislative drafting
or plain language commission, is only adding to
the frustration over the statute book by many who
wish to interact with it, as was evidenced in the
health care debate. Bentham acutely sums up this
status quo mindset by asking, "[A] great deal of bad
legislation, the work of a variety of hands, all of them
very indifferently qualified, may be endured, and
the mischief flowing from it may continue to flow
without much notice. Why?"1 29
B. Implementing Features of Plain Language
A common perception among plain language
critics is that employing such standards merely means
"dumbing down" such language or making it less
accurate.13 0  However, plain language advocates,
including many official drafting offices noted above,
disagree with this assessment. As Krongold notes,
Although the drafter cannot often
influence the complexity of the
policy that gives rise to statute law,
the drafter is responsible for making
sure that everyone who is supposed
to be able to read a statute will be
able to read it. And he or she does
this, not by reducing it to kindergar-
ten level, but by directing it to the
level of the identified readers.131
Of course, any so-called "movement"
will have hard-liners that tend to advocate their
reforms in the strictest manner, even in the face of
practical problems. Yet most drafting offices that
have implemented plain language standards are not
among the aforementioned group; they are practical
legal experts who believe that striving to make laws
clearer and more understandable will benefit their
jurisdiction's governance. Examining plain language
principles demonstrates that advocates of the practice
take the intricacies of legislation into considerable
thought. Drafters who advocate plain language offer
a host of common suggestions:132
VOCABULARY, GRAMMAR, AND STYLE
* Use English: Latin words and phrases
should be shunned1 33
* Archaic words should be avoided (e.g.
"hereby", "thereto", etc.)
* Use of excessively formalized words should
be discouraged for simpler words (e.g.
"fax" in place of "facsimile", or "e-mail"
rather than "electronic communication")
* Synonyms are repetitive and should be
avoided (e.g., 11null and void", "full and
complete", etc.)
* Initials and acronyms can be helpful
* Common symbols can make text easier to
read (e.g., "%", "$")
* The active voice is preferable to the passive
* The present tense should be used
* Drafting in the third person is preferable
* Use singular rather than the plural
* Express cardinal numbers above two as
figures (e.g., 3, 4, 5...)
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STRUCTURE/DESIGN
* The primary substance of the act should
be put at the beginning
* Including tables of contents can aid both
the drafter and the reader
* Accurate titles can aid in understanding
* Brevity is preferred; but it is acknowledged
that longer sentences can at times provide
increased clarity if too many ideas are not
presented at once
* Incorporating lists are often a good way of
conveying information
* Running headers and running footers can
help readers locate material
READABILITY
* Increase the amount of white pace on the
page
* Definitions should be used sparingly
* Examples may be used to help understand
the meaning of provisions
* Cross-referencing can easily become
confusing; restraint should be used when
incorporating such references
* Especially in lengthy pieces of legislation,
signposts (e.g., "see section 1"), marginal
notes and flow charts can be helpful
* Formulas, diagrams and footnotes can
improve readability, if constructed
carefully and properly
The three focus areas above offer a way
forward. Generally, the style section focuses on
drafting nuances, such as eliminating Latin phrasing,
synonyms, and excessively formalized words, while
drafting in the present tense, active voice and third
person is preferable. The structure section takes into
account the understandability aspects of legislation,
hoping that such aspects as controlling the length
of sentences and increasing accuracy in titles can
positively influence the text. The final section
provides some easily implemented recommendations
for improving readability, such as using signposts,
diagrams and examples, and using restraint when
making cross-references.
The practices related to plain language
mentioned above do not "dumb down" the text or
make it more vague or ambiguous; they merely
simplify and clarify the language being used and
offer suggestions on how to improve readability
and understanding. Implementing many of these
practices could be easily done by most drafting offices,
and the recommendations themselves should not be
overly controversial. As Krongold states, "[w]hen the
principles are applied, the law should be just as legally
precise as it was before but clearer and more inviting
to the reader."'
VI. Conclusion
Domestic and international momentum
for plain language statutory drafting is increasing
throughout drafting offices, public forums and among
the citizenry.135 This heightened appeal for clearer
laws appears in a global context that is more accepting
of the public's interest in accessing and understanding
legislation.136 What many plain language critics fail
to grasp is that most advocates of the practice are not
demanding a complete and thorough restatement of
laws; they merely want contemporary laws drafted
with more clarity and with an aim to improve
understanding by those interacting with legislation.137
Some seem to fear that adoption of plain language
standards would threaten the legal profession; such
fears are entirely unfounded.'3" There will never
be a utopia in which the public - regardless of
education or experience - understands the meaning
of every law. Nevertheless, increasing the clarity and
understanding of governmental communications
(in this case, statutes) is indeed an honorable and
worthwhile endeavor. It would be of much benefit
to the American people should Congress and their
corresponding Legislative Counsels implement official
plain language drafting standards in accordance with
their international contemporaries.
A few insider responses above do provide
hope for the prospect of plain statutory language, and
the health care debate certainly had a large impact on
Capitol Hill and throughout the country for those
interacting with legislation. Unfortunately, this brief
moment of attention on the opacity and complexity
of statutory text seems to have faded, or is at least
waiting in the wings for the ascendance of the next
landmark piece of legislation. According to many of
the interviews presented in this article, plain language
implementation for U.S. statutory law seems a far
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way off. The central missing piece of the puzzle at
this point is the public, who "must insist on legislative
texts that they can understand."139 Until the citizenry
demands that laws be written with an increased focus
on plain language principles, change is unlikely in
U.S. statutory law.
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